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Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission to this inquiry.  
 
1.    Summary 
In this submission about the impact of legal provisions entitling law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies to access the confidential information of journalists, we comment mainly on the 
journalism information warrants scheme introduced by the Telecommunications (Interception and 
Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (the metadata law). There are other aspects of the 
legal framework that we consider raise concerns for press freedom, but which we are unable to 
address here. Examples include: 
 the access to data on journalists’ devices enabled by the Telecommunications and other 
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 
 the treatment of journalists in the context of special intelligence operations under the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and 
 the offences in relation to secrecy contained in the Criminal Code Act 1995. 
While we appreciate that journalist information warrants were introduced as a means of addressing 
concerns over press freedom, we think these protections are ineffective. Taken together, the 
various laws that allow access to journalists’ confidential information or which preclude access to 
information about government activities have compromised a core requirement of Australian 
journalism: that confidences given in the course of journalistic work will be protected. This 
protection of sources is not an end in itself. The public interest in the freedom of journalists to 
investigate and report on matters likely to be of concern to the Australian community is a key part 
of the accountability of executive government in democratic societies. In the legitimate weighing of 
national security against access to information and freedom of expression, Australia has now 
moved too far down the path of secrecy and suppression. In short, the scope of the law is no 
longer proportional to the perceived risk. We believe these laws impose onerous penalties on 
journalists and their publishers.  We believe the secrecy invoked in these acts is excessive.   
It is therefore appropriate that these laws be reviewed and we acknowledge the important role of 
the Committee in this work. While we think there would be benefit in a more comprehensive review 
of the impact of the law on journalism, we make the following recommendations on targeted 
amendments to the journalism information warrants scheme. 
 
Recommendations: 
1. The journalism information warrant scheme should be amended to prohibit access to a 
journalist’s confidential information except where there is a serious threat to Australia’s 
national security. This would be determined by a judge of a superior court on application for a 
warrant. 
2. The application would seek a declaration that there is a serious threat to Australia’s national 
security and the issuing of a warrant to access the journalist’s confidential information. 
3. Where such an application is made, the journalist and his or her publisher and the Public 
Interest Advocate must be provided with adequate notice of the hearing and be given the 
opportunity to put the case against the issuing of the warrant or to make representations on 
how terms of access can be appropriately restricted. 
4. A public interest test should apply to the issuing of the warrant so that the benefit of issuing it 
significantly outweighs the harm that might be caused to press freedom. 
As part of these changes, we further recommend: 
 that an annual report on the operation of these laws be tabled in Federal parliament; 







2.    Background 
 
We note the Committee’s chair in his media release said the inquiry was called in response to the 
concerns raised over the search warrants recently executed on members of the media.  There 
were, of course, wide-spread concerns expressed in Australia and overseas about the 
circumstances surrounding the Australian Federal Police’s execution of those search warrants.  
But we believe it is important that these recent concerns be seen in the larger context of warnings 
made by various individuals and groups over the last several years about the dangerously 
restrictive and punitive effect that a series of new security laws was having on the foundations of 
Australian democracy.  
To give one prominent example:  in 2015 Professor George Williams conducted a broad search of 
then current Commonwealth, state and territory laws and identified 350 provisions which in his 
view infringed one or other of a number of democratic freedoms he identified as supporting 
Australia’s system of representative democracy.1  Those freedoms were freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom of movement and freedom to protest.  Of 
those 350 provisions, he noted that 209 had been enacted since the September 11, 2001 attacks 
on the World Trade Center in New York which he therefore concluded was the date of an important 
turning point in lawmaking in Australia: 
Those attacks and the compelling need to respond forcefully to the threat of terrorism, gave 
greater license to our legislators to depart from long accepted conventions and 
understandings about the preservation of democratic rights in Australia.  As a result, the 
abrogation of democratic rights, including stringent measures that were previously 
unthinkable, have become common place. 
Since 2015, further Commonwealth enactments have been made which we say have borne out his 
concerns.  Among them are: 
 the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 
(the metadata law); 
 the National Security Amendment Act (No 1) 2015; 
 the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 
2018;  
 the Telecommunications and other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 
2018 (the assistance and access law).  
We note that we have already made submissions to this committee about the National Security 
Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018.2    
Given the short timeframe of this inquiry and its indicated focus, we will concentrate this 
submission on what we perceive to be the deleterious effect the metadata law is having on the 
practice of journalism in Australia.  
 
3.    The metadata law 
 
The Australian metadata law of 2015 should be seen in its international context, as part of a world-
wide tightening of national security laws in the wake of the September 11 attacks and, in particular, 
the Snowden leaks of classified and sensitive information in 2013.   
The law implemented a national data retention scheme – by way of amendment to the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (the TIA Act) – under which 
telecommunications service providers are obliged to retain certain types of telecommunications 
                                               
1 George Williams, ‘The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy’ (2015) 16(2) QUT Law Review 19. 





data for two years.  A number of criminal law-enforcement agencies can have access to these 
records and can do so without judicial oversight.   
Concerns over the adverse impact the new metadata law would have on journalism, and in 
particular on a journalist’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of sources, prompted the 
amendment to the proposed act introducing the journalist information warrant scheme.  Under this 
scheme, agencies wanting to search retained metadata to identify a journalist’s source are 
required to first obtain a journalist information warrant. Such warrants are issued at the discretion 
of an issuing authority. For law enforcement agencies, this is a judicial officer approved by the 
minister, a member of the Administrative Appeals tribunal or a lawyer specially appointed by the 
minister. For ASIO, it is the Attorney-General. Under the law, the issuing authority must undertake 
a balancing exercise of competing public interests when considering whether or not to grant a 
journalist information warrant.  The public interest in the issue of the warrant must outweigh the 
public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the source.   
The law enshrouds this whole process in secrecy.  The journalist or media company whose 
metadata is being targeted by the agency will not be informed that the metadata is being sought.  
This secrecy is enforced by a potential two-year jail sentence for revealing the existence of a 
journalist information warrant. While the targeted journalist or media organisation can therefore 
have no input into the consideration of an application for a journalist information warrant, the newly 
created Public Interest Advocate can. The current Public Interest Advocates were appointed by the 
Prime Minister.  They are entitled to make submissions when a journalist’s metadata is being 
sought by an agency which must be considered before the application is granted or rejected. 
Following the introduction of the metadata law there was a move from some in the media and 
media commentators to rely on encryption to conceal communication with sources.  But this move 
has been rendered nugatory with the passing the recent Telecommunications and Other 
Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018.  
 
 
4.    The EU experience 
 
In 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) declared that the European 
Union’s Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) was invalid. The Library of Congress 
report on the ECJ’s decision3 noted that the data required to be retained by telecommunication 
providers included the number dialling, the number dialled, user IDs as well as call-forwarding and 
call transfer records. The retention period was up to two years.  The purpose of the retention was 
to prevent, investigate, detect and prosecute serious crimes such as organised crime and 
terrorism.  The content of individual communications was not retained. The EU’s data retention 
scheme therefore had many similarities with the subsequent Australian metadata laws.   
The data retention directive was held to be invalid on the grounds that it exceeded the limits of 
proportionality. It was held it entailed serious interference with the rights to privacy and personal 
data protection of individuals guaranteed by the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and failed to 
establish limits on access by competent national authorities, such as prior review by a judicial 
authority.  
It was held that while the retention of data was an appropriate and valuable tool in combatting 
serious crime or terrorism, it affected not only those who might be engaged in such criminal or 
terrorist conduct but also the large swathe of European citizens for whom there was no evidence of 
involvement in serious crime or terrorism. Further, it was held the directive failed to establish 
substantive or procedural limits on access to the retained data and failed to make access by state 
authorities conditional on a prior review carried out by a court or other independent administrative 
authority.  As regards the retention period of up to two years, it held that the directive did not set 
any objective criteria to limit the appropriate retention period to what was strictly necessary.   






As a result, the Data Retention Directive was rendered void ab initio and EU member states which 
had transposed the directive into their national laws had to ensure compliance with the ECJ 
judgment. 
While the ECJ judgment arises from a consideration of its impact on the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, many of the shortcomings of the EU data retention scheme are common to 
the Australian metadata retention scheme.  
 
5.    Importance of protecting journalist sources 
 
To understand journalists’ concerns about the intrusions of the metadata law and the access and 
assistance law, it is useful to give a brief explanation of the importance of maintaining 
confidentiality in the practice of journalism and a brief outline of the limited protections that had 
been granted over the years to journalists prior to the introduction of the metadata law and the 
interception and access law.   
 
Code of Ethics 
The protection of confidential sources is fundamental to Australian journalism. It is formulated in 
article 3 the MEAA (Media, Entertainment & Arts Alliance) Code of Ethics: 
Aim to attribute information to its source. Where a source seeks anonymity, do not agree 
without first considering the source’s motives and any alternative attributable source. 
Where confidences are accepted, respect them in all circumstances. 
This ethical code is universally observed throughout the media industry even though such 
observance has occasionally resulted in journalists being jailed and fined. That is because the 
observance of such an ethical code will put the journalist into direct conflict with the court’s duty to 
serve the broad interests of justice.  We accept that judges are sometimes put in very difficult 
positions when a journalist refuses to answer questions because of this ethical stance. As a result, 
from time to time, individual journalists have come into direct conflict with the courts when they 
have abided by the code of ethics in the face of a court order that they reveal their source. For 
example, in 1989 Tony Barrass, a journalist on The Sunday Times in Western Australia, was 
sentenced to seven days’ jail by a Perth magistrate for refusing to reveal who had given him two 
tax files in a case against a tax clerk accused of leaking information.  He served that time and was 
then fined $10,000 for maintaining his refusal when the case reached the District Court.  (The tax 
clerk was convicted even without Tony Barrass’s evidence.  His penalty: a fine of $6,000.)  In 2007 
two Herald Sun journalists, Gerard McManus and Michael Harvey, were convicted of contempt for 
refusing to reveal their source for a story about the Howard government scaling back 
recommended benefits for war veterans.  They were spared jail but fined $7,000 each for contempt 
with their convictions recorded against them.  
 
Shield laws 
Partly as a result of criticisms of the handling of the McManus and Harvey case, ‘shield laws’ were 
introduced by the Commonwealth and states.  While an improvement for the media, the shield 
laws fell well short of granting journalists immunity from having to reveal their sources.  Ultimately, 
it is up to the judge to decide, after hearing from the publisher, whether to grant the journalist’s 
claim for privilege. The relevant provisions of section 126K of the Commonwealth Evidence Act 
1995 are: 
(1) If a journalist has promised an informant not to disclose the informant’s identity, neither 
the journalist nor his or her employer is compellable to answer any question or produce 
any document that would disclose the identity of the informant or enable that identity to 
be ascertained. 
(2) The court may, on the application of a party, order that subsection (1) is not to apply if it 





public interest in the disclosure of evidence of the identity of the informant outweighs: 
(a)  any likely adverse effect of the disclosure on the informant or any other person; and 
(b)  the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the 




In defamation law, media defendants are frequently put at a disadvantage because of their 
determination to protect the identity of their confidential sources.  It is common practice in 
defamation cases not to put journalists with source problems into the witness box.  This can mean 
that the media defendant has to attempt to defend the action with one hand tied behind its back. 
Partial recognition of the journalist’s obligations of confidentiality resulted in the development of the 
Newspaper Rule.  However, the Newspaper Rule is a rule of practice and not of law.  It allows 
media defendants to not reveal a confidential source in the preliminary stages of a defamation 
case such as discovery of documents and answering interrogatories.  It does not extend to 
protecting journalists in the witness box.  
 
6.    Problems with the metadata law 
 
In a recent paper, Professor Spencer Zifcak , Allan Myers Professor of Law at the Australian 
Catholic University, wrote that the journalist information warrant regime offers journalists ‘next to 
no protection at all’.4 The main problems with the journalist information warrant regime are that the 
public interest test itself is inadequate and that there is no independent and impartial assessment 
of the warrant application by a superior court judge. Though not specifically concerned with access 
to journalists’ metadata, the ECJ had similar concerns about the EU’s Data Retention Directive 
referred to above.  The warrant application will be determined by an authority appointed by the 
minister.  The journalist’s interests may or may not be represented by the public interest advocate, 
an official appointed by the Prime Minister. We think it is important to retain the position of Public 
Interest Advocate in order to cover matters where a journalist or smaller publisher is not able to 
access the significant resources needed to present arguments before a judge.  However, we think 
the law needs to address the fact that this whole process is undertaken without the knowledge or 
participation of the journalist or media company, in strict secrecy with severe penalties for 
revealing even the existence of such a warrant.  Professor Zifcak pointed out the ABC warrant was 
issued by a court registrar and wrote ‘This is hopelessly unsatisfactory’. We agree with that 
assessment and believe journalists and publishers should be given the opportunity to appear 
before a judge who will determine first whether there is a serious threat to national security, and 
second whether a warrant should be issued. 
In civil litigation, media companies are regularly subpoenaed for documents and information or 
served with suppression orders.  From time to time they challenge the scope and purpose of such 
subpoenas and orders.  Their challenges are frequently heard by superior court judges.  It is not 
uncommon, in fact it is all too common, that such applications attract extensive suppression orders 
which journalists and their publishers invariably respect.5  Even allowing for the fact that the law 
enforcement agency might be involved in very sensitive investigations, there is no reason, based 
on this experience, why journalists or publishers should not be given notice that they are the 
subject of a journalist information warrant and be given the chance to be heard on the application 
by a superior court judge.  To maintain the current regime would be another example of what 
Professor Williams described above as the ‘abrogation of democratic rights’ and the imposition of 
‘stringent measures that were previously unthinkable’.   
                                               
4 Spencer Zifcak, ‘Journalists, Media Freedom and the Law’, published on the Pearls and Irritations website, 
johnmenadue.com. 
5 According to the count of a News Corp media lawyer, in 2018 over 700 suppression orders were made by Australian 






7.    A question for the Committee 
 
Amid this necessarily legalistic discussion, this Committee may wish to consider a more textured 
question: to what extent does the public interest as defined and practised by the news media 
coincide with the protecting of the public and interests as enshrined in various security legislation? 
This is not dinner party banter: both informing the public (and holding the powerful to account) and 
protecting it are within the sphere of the public interest. While we do not seek to equate protecting 
public from, say, acts of terrorism with the multiple roles played by the news media, we would wish 
to note the positive effects of public interest journalism, a term which has multiple definitions, but, 
as the economist Henry Ergas notes, ‘is best interpreted to mean journalism that confers large 
positive “externalities” on the public, in the sense that the social gains exceed whatever monetary 
payment the journalist might earn from publishing an article’.6  Ergas adds a further definition: that 
investigative and public interest journalism primarily focuses on situations involving the abuse of 
private or public power. 
 
Another consideration is the public value inherent in professional journalistic standards of 
accountability, accuracy and ethical conduct. For journalism to work in the public interest, it must 
prove on a minute to minute basis its value to the public. It does so by producing news and 
information which would otherwise not be in the public domain and adhering, in the process of 
doing so, to a set of external and internal standards. These standards are subject to scrutiny by 
various industry, legal and regulatory bodies. They are, regrettably, breached on rare occasions, 
but to a large extent, they are not. These standards – and the practices they inspire – sit at the 
very core of journalism’s proposition to act in the public interest and to produce positive 
externalities for doing so. Any journalist, editor or publisher wishing to work in the public interest 
ignores them at their peril.  
 
8.    Conclusion  
 
The rapid development of cyber technology in the last several years has increased the scope for 
cybercrime and the risks to national cyber security.  But the very same advances have given law 
enforcement and security agencies new tools to combat such threats.  Parliament has not been 
slow in deploying these tools, such as in the legislation being examined by this inquiry.  
Parliament’s determination to counter such threats is, of course, proper and prudent.  But we have 
sought to argue in this submission that the almost certainly unintended by product of Federal 
parliament’s efforts has been an overriding of civil freedoms that have been developed, sometimes 
with great difficulty, during the long evolution of our system of liberal democracy.  The fact this 
inquiry has been called shows that Parliament is not insensitive to these risks.   
We have attempted to put our concerns about the two specific acts, the metadata law and the 
assistance and access law, into the broader picture of freedom-infringing legislation introduced in 
particular since September 11, 2001. We believe they render impossible, or potentially impossible, 
a core requirement of Australian journalism: that confidences given in the course of journalistic 
work will always be protected.  They expose journalists and their publishers to very severe 
penalties.  And they enshroud this whole process with alarming strictures of secrecy. 
 
 
                                               
6 H Ergas, J Pincus and S Schnittger, (2017) The Crucial Role of Public Interest Journalism in Australia and the 
Economic Forces Affecting It, Green Square Associates. 
